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Introduction1
Since ancient times, successive migrations have made their imprint on the
formtion of both societies and states in Southeast Asia. Ancient population
movements from southeast China followed the valleys in southward direetion to
trade, settle and eonquer. Sea-borne traders came from Persia and the Arab world,
especially durng the 15th eentury's unprecednted growth of eommerce. From
India eame advisors to kings, from Eurpe a c1ass of colonial rulers. Colonialism
in tur stimulated a massive inflow of migrt labor that from the mid-19th
eentur and onwards enrehedthe ethnie mosaie of Southeast Asian societies
which previous population movements had put in plaee.
The politieal implications in the receiving areas range from the most fundamental
- the eonquest of state power by new migrants - to the more indiet sueh as
influenee wielded by a parieular ethnie group in a nation's political eeonomy. The
former eoneerns the eore of national seeurty as eommonly defined; the latter may
affeet regime security and cIvil order. Sinee the term "seeurity" is eommonly used
to legitimize parieularist interests - not least in the Southeast Asian context
where "foreign" groups readily have been depieted as a seeurity threats - we
shall here use the term "political" to analyze the effeets of migration on state and
cIvil society in the reeeiving areas.
Obviously numerous and eomplex, the political eonsequenees nevertheless emerge
with some c1arty in a eomparative perspeetive. If we consider the major
population movements in Southeast Asia, it beeomes evident that eaeh migration
had a different, principal impaet.
In historieal terms, the major population movements in Southeast Asia appear in
four phases. The ancient southward migrations led to settlements at the periphery
of established polities, and eventually eonquest of state power. In some eases, the
new arvals also subjugated or expelled existing populations, effeetively absorbing
or extinguishing the older society. Elsewhere, a melting-pot meehanism developed.
The distinguishing feature of both migrations, however, was that the migrants
assumed politieal power by miltar eonquest of the state apparatus.
During the eolonial period, labor migration from China and, to a lesser extent,
India, reaehed unpreeedented leveIs. The full politieal implieations of eultural
pluralism eame to the fore when the eolonized states beeame independent,
1 Prepared for the Conference on the Impact of Interntional Migration on the Security and
Internal Stabilty of States, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 5 and 6, 1991. To be published in Myron
Weiner (ed.): International Migration and Security. Boulder Co.: Westview Press, 1993.
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generating both social conflct and international tension. The migrants and their
descendants formed distinet ethnic minorities. They occupied a special niche in the
political economy and, by virue of their ethnic identity, had clear.ties to a large
power in the region. Insofar as China aspired to an assertve international role, the
cross-boundar ethnic ties had grat political signifcance and eau sed deep
tensions.
For the rulers of Southeast Asia's post-colonial states, the lessons of history were
unambiguous: migration was a matter of high polities. Migration affected at the
very least the strctue of civil society, at most decided who would capture the
state, and migrants from major regional countres created foreign policy
complications. Coupled with nationalist and economic imperatives in the post-
colonial order, these were compellng reasons to halt furer in-migration. For
years, Southeast Asian governments demonstrated both the wil and abilty to
exclude new migrants. Even the very large refugee flows generated by the
Indochina wars from 1975 and onwards were tightly controlled and only
temporarlyaccommodated.
The refugees were unwanted on most accounts. They seerned to represent an
economic burden, a political liabilty, a foreign policy complication, or all of the
above. Additionally, the massive flows posed a more subtle but profound threat.
Arving unannounced, uninvited and landing in large numbers on the border and
beaches in Southeast Asia, the refugees resembled an invading force. The invasion
metaphor strck at the core of the receiving state; the very abilty of the state to
function according to modem precepts by exercizing control throughout its
terrtory was challenged. Yet, the essentially political nature of international
refugee movements also gave a foreign policy dimension to the act of granting of
asylum, which at times was welcomed. As we shall see, the Indochinese refugees,
like refugee movements generally , cared with them some of the strggle from
which they fled. This transformed them into potentially useful instruments of
foreign policy for the receiving state.
Labor migrtion within and into the region stared in the late 1970s as several
countres experienced rapid economic growth and industralization. 1980s. The
movements included both legal and ilegal flows which created serious political
challenges in some of the receiving states.
The political consequences of migration in the receiving societies, then, can be
grouped in three broad categories, each associated with types of movements that
have occurred. These are (1) the impact on the control of the state apparatus,
typically associated with miltar conquest and large-scale settlement; (2) the
impact on the structure of civil society, exemplified by the appearance of diaspora
related to labor migration; and (3) assets and liabilties in foreign policy,
depending primary on relations with the sending state and typically associated
with diaspora populations and refugee movements. In what follows, we shall
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consider the more specifc forms which the impact may take, and their
determnants.
While this paper wil focus on the receiving states, it should be recalled that also
sending countres are subject to a range of political effects. The most common
problematic element is that refugees or migrants wil engage in revanchist politics
from abroad. This and other political considerations were paraDount for socialist
regimes that thoughout most of the post World War Il era prohibited outmigration
(Dowty 1987). Political concerns also led many Chinese rulers before 1949 to
forbid outmigration, although with more symbolie than practical effect. Strong
control mechanisms in communist China made prohibitions more effective, as
expressed most dramatically in the slogan of the Cultural Revolution: "Y ou cannot
run away from your Shadow!"
On the other side of the balance sheet is relief that "unwanted" social groups,
ethnic minorities or political enemies leave. This was certainly a factor in
Vietnam's policies towards deparures after 1975. Although formally ilegal, the
exodus was intermittently faciltated and even encouragedby the authorities. There
is no evidence, however, that Vietnam or any other sending countr in the region
deliberately generated mass outflows in order to destabilze or subvert the
receiving states. Mass-migration evidently did not lend itself as a foreign policy
instrment for the sending state (Sutter 1990:96, et.passim.)
1. Andent migrations
Following the major river valleys, the ancient migrations in Southeast Asia moved
southward from the interior (Coedes 1964, Cady 1966, Hall 1968).Centuries before
the Buddhist era, the Mon people moved from western China into the Menam
valley and the Malay peninsula. A little later and further east, the Funanese and
the Cham came as "a kind of rear-guard element" of this early movement (Cady
1966:29) The next major migrations appear during the first millennium AD. The
Khmer moved down the Mekong river but came to a halt on the outer fringes of
the ancient, hinduized kingdom of the Funanese. Centered on the Great Lake in
contemporar Cambodia, the Funan kings accepted the Khmer settlements as
vassaIs. The Khmer duly constituted themselves into the Chenla state. Although
many Chenla Khmer in the lower Mekong valley were assimilated into the
Funanese cultur, and intermarage between the Funan and the Chenla rulers took
place, this did not prevent an intense political rivalry from developing. In the 6th
century, Chenla Khmer princes usurped the imperial throne, setting in motion the
dec line of the Funan empire.
On the fragments of Funan, the great Khmer kingdom of the c1assical period
would rise. By the 13th century, the Kingdom of Angkor was at its zenith. At that
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point, the historical processed seerned to repe at itself. The geographical extension
of Khmer authority was rolled back, heralding the decline of the Angkor kings.
The roll-back was primarly effected by the T'ai speakng people who since the
900s had been moving down the river valleys from the Nan Chao kingdom in
south western China. They settled on the periphery of the Khmer empire, accepted
the political authority of the King, and many among them entercd his service as
mercenaries. In the early 13th centur , the steady southward mckle grw to an
"effervescence" when Nan Chao was attacked by invadig Mongol-Chinese ares
(Coees 1964:346). At the same time, the T'ais on the outer reaches of the Khmer
empire established a fortfied militar garson at Sukothai in the upper Menam
valley. A commander in the Khmer imperial any of T' ai aneestr dec1ared the
settlement autonomous. His son - the famous Ram Kamheng of Thai annals -
put the influx of refugees from Nan Chao to goo use byenlisting them in his
anies and, towards the end of the 13th century, pushed Khmer authority further
south, picking up defecting vassals along the way.
The dynamic in both the Funan and the Khmer case is a c1assic conquest through
migration, that is, the security of the state - in the sense of the power of the
ruling king - is undermined by increasing pressures from new peoples settled on
the periphery. As the new arrvals gain strength, parly by entering the political
sphere of the central power through marage alliances or military service, the
stage is set for a contest over political power. In one resolution of the conflict, the
upstar captures central state power as the throne is usurped (Chenla Khmer contra
Funan). In another dynamic, the power of the center is whittled away from the
periphery as the upstars takes controlover progressively more terrtory and people
(T'ai contra Khmer).
The T'ai model is yet more complex, possibly representing a prototype of political
subversion. The T'ai-speakng migrants did not displace the local populations, but
mixed culturally and intermared with Mon and Khmer (Hall 1968:171). This has
tended to obscur the historical tracks to the point that historians stil disagree as
to what really happened: Was the southward expansion of the T'ai primarlya
migration of people, or chiefly a movement of cultures? (Osborne 1979:90,
Silverman 1974:54). Possibly, relatively few T'ai migrated, yet succeeded in
establishing their cultural primacy in the lower Menam valley through conversion.
As society changed, so did thechallenge to the state. It was the elite of this new
cultural community, called T' ai, that displaced the old Khmer authority in
Sukothai and beyond.
Whether the T'ais arved en masse or not, there is general agreement that the
T'ais did not displace the local people. The early T'ai kings deliberately followed
a policy to accommodate diverse cultures within the dominant T'ai. Thus, the
migrations threatened primarly the state, not society. One major reasons was the
balanee between population and resources in the area. The lower Menam valley
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was sparsely inhabited, and remained so for centues. Manpower, not land, was
the principal restraint on power for successive Thai kings (Akn 1969, Dhiravat
1990). The point applied to mainland and peninsular Southeast Asia more
generally. Even though prevailing technology permttd cultivation in only a small
area, perhaps amounting to only 12 per cent of the lowland regions, land was not
in short supply (Fisher 1974:6). Even at the beginning of the 19th century,
Southeast Asia's population was probably under 25 millon people, or about 1/8
that of India and 1/12 of China (Ibid.:11).
Vietnam constituted an exception, and also presents a düferent migration pattem.
The Red River delta in the Nort was densely populate, pary due to the
introduction of Chinese irgation technology which permitted an increase in
agrcultural production. Population den sit y , political rivalres, and refugee flght
generated a steady southward movement of the Vietnamese. Unlike the T'ai, the
Vietnamese displaced other cultural groups as they moved. From ca. 900 AD and
onwards, the Vietnamese moved southward through settlement, militar annexation
and expulsion until stopped by the countervailng power of European colonialism.
For Vietnam's neighbors to the south, the migration clearly constituted a threat to
both state and society. The first victim was the Champa kingdom, previously a
buffer between the Vietnamese and the Khmer states. Both the Champa state and
the Cham as a nation "disappear from history", as C.P. Fitzgerald puts it, in the
late l5thcentury (C.P. Fitzgerald 1972:30). The pressure was subsequently
transferred to the Khmer, compellng the Khmer King to cede terrtory and largely
forcing the Khmer people out of the Mekong delta.
2. The colonial period and its legacy
European colonialism brought new mass migrations to Southeast Asia, not from
Europe which did not send settlers, but from Asia's two most populous countres:
China and India. The economic boom of early colonialism, coupled with open
immigration policies and in some cases direct importation of needed labor for
plantations and mining enterprises, produced a sustained inflow from China to all
of Southeast Asia from the mid-19th century and onwards. Coincidental upheavals
in China served as strong "push factors".
In cities throughout the European empires - from the British Straits Settlements,
to the French-ruled Cholon and the walledcity of Manila - commercial life eame
to be concentrated in the hands of the Chinese. Plantations in the Dutch East
Indies relIed parlyon Chinese labor, in the neighborig Malayan peninsula, robber
estates and tin mining companies used overwhelmingly Chinese labor. Recognizing
only economic and imperial boundaries, European colonial rulers also effected
population transfers within the colonized realm. Indians went from the South
Asian subcontinent to work in both the civIl service and the plantation sector of
Malaya; Vietnamese moved into the commercial and civil service niches in
5
French-ruled Laos and Camboda. In another cIassic pattern, population
movements that were induced by the colonial boom became themselves a spur to
furter colonization. When rival Chinese groups working the tin-mines in the
Malayan sultanates virually went to war over control of the mines, the Sultan of
Perak invited the British in the neighboring Straits Settlements to restore law and
order. The process culminated in extension of British colonial rule over most of
the peninsula, constituted into the Federated Malay states. Also Thailand, the only
Southeast Asian countr not to be colonized, experienced massive in-migration
from China as the colonially-induced economic growth created new demands and
opportunities.
On ly the Philppines did not fit the pattern. Spanish colonial rule was
schizophrenic in its policy towards the Chinese. Since the native Filpinos were
kept backwards, niches in the colonial economy for arisans and traders were filled
by other peoples. The Chinese readily moved in, but the growth of the community
was stunted by restrctive legislation. Whenever the Chinese protested, they were
subjected to periodic massacres - including three major ones in the l600s - that
signifcantly reduced their numbers. When the U.S. replaced the Spanish as rulers,
the exclusionar immgration laws applying to Chinese on mainland U.S.A were
also applied to the Philppines.
The mass migrations from China into Southeast Asia ~ staring in the mid l800s
and lasting for about a centu - left a complicated and sensitive political legacy
in the receiving countres (Purcell 1965, Wiliams 1966, C.P. Fitzgerald 1972,
Wang 1978, 1981, Suryiadinata 1985). Ethnic hierarchies and politically significant
divisions of labor were established; their stereotypical equivalents portrayed the
Chinese as industrous and upwardly mobile, frequently as middlemen positioned
between "the lazy natives" and the colonial rulers. In the post~colonial states, the
question of the Overseas Chinese came to bede vil domestie politics and foreign
policy for decades.2
Four principal factors explain the political significance of the immigration and its
consequences in post-colonial Southeast Asia: the size of the Chinese community,
its role in the local political economy, the strcture of social conflct in the
countr of residence, and the pattern of international relations in the region.
The size of the Chinese diaspora was a principal determnant of the relationship
between the community and the nation. In Singapore, where the Chinese
constituted a large majority, the community in effect absorbed the nation. The
2 These problems were less pronounced in Thailand which, as it was never was colonized, early
on adopte a thorough assimilation policy. Cultural simiIaties between Theravada Buddhist
Thais and immigrant Chinese also faciltated assimilation. For a recent study, se Cushman
199 i.
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principal restraints lay in foreign policy, which dictated that Singapore had to
"compensate" for its Chinesness by officia11y lying low in its relationship with
China - or at least, lower than Singapore's non-Chinese neighbours. Only thus
could Singapore demonstrate its regional credtentials as an independent and
reliable state. In neighboring Malaysia, the Chinese were suffciently numerous
(almost 40 per cent) to organize as a political community with distinct political
institutions. The institutionalized pluralism of Malaysian politics ensur that
virually all questions of domestic and foreign policy acquired an ethnic
dimension. In the remaining Southeast Asian states, the eilnic Chinese formed a
small minority, ranging from nearly 10 per cent in Thailand to about 2 per cent
in Indonesia and even less in the Philppines. The only realistic choice for the se
Chinese was to influence the terms of integration through individual paricipation
in the political arena.
The socio-economic position of the Chinese cared with it both assets and
liabilties in the political arena. By the mid-20th centur, the Chinese immigrants
had formed concentrated, highly visible minorities in the urban landscape of
Southeast Asia. Upward mobilty during the colonial period had put them in
critical middle-men positions in the post-colonial economy. They constituted
agents of economic growth, critical to the development policies announced by the
newly independent government. At the same time, they were a physically distinet
and politically vulnerable minority. They had poor nationalist creditentials and
during the independence movement had shown more interest in the epochal battle
underway in China than in the politics of their adopted countr. They labored
under varous forms of discrimination, ranging from employment to citizenship
restrctions, that made assimilation and paricipation diffcult even when it was
desired.
The relationship between these "parah entrpreneurs" and the host societies was
complex and contradictory. There was certainly an element of symbiosis between
Chinese capital and the elites whose position deri ved from bureaucratie or miltar
power (as in Indonesia and Thailand). At the same time, Chinese traders and
entrepreneurs came into conflct with emerging indigenous, entrepreneurs and were
of ten the object of economic indigenization polices and other discriminatory
measures (Golay 1969, Lim and Gosling 1983). Such policies also had broader,
populist appeal which was useful to the new nationalist elites anxious to establish
their legitimacy after independence (Steinberg 1987). In this calculus, the overseas
Chinese appeared as a threat both to nationalist identity and paricularst economic
interests.
The international context legitimized a wider stigmatization of Chinese immigrant
communities. The rise of revolutionar China, which for years followed a
declaratory policy of supporting radical change in Southeast Asia and elsewhere,
raised the Overseas Chinese issue to a new leveL. In 1950, China had dec1ard a
jus sanguinis policy: all Overse as Chinese were to be regarded as nationals of
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China. Five years later this was dramatically repudiated by Chou-En lai at the
Bandung conference. The Chinese were asked to mae a choice, and those who
chose their countr of residence forfeited all claim to Chinese nationality. The
principle, as emboded in the Chinese- Indonesian agrment on dual nationality,
effectively shifted the matter to a jus soli principle. But suspicion in Southeast
Asia that the Overseas Chinese nevertheless might form a fifth column of China
were not easily allayed, and were dramatically revived durng the Cultural
Revolution. From 1966 and onwards, Beijing's established policy towards the
Overseas Chinese was thrown into disaray, and new forces in China gave at least
"the appearance of an offensive to mobilze all Chiese abroad in the cause of
revolution" (S.Fitzgerald 1972:169).
In the bifurcated world and hostile ideological climate of the cold war, the vision
of communist Chinese expansion became axiomatic among the elites of non-
communist Southeast Asia. China acted as a great power in the region, while the
Southeast Asian countres were weak, intemally divided, and several faced
communist-Ied insurgencies. Some rebels had well~known support from local
Chinese, as in Malaysia where the Malayan Communist Pary recruited heavily
from the local Chinese. Ethnic Chinese also controlled the Communist Pary of
Thailand and took their ideological cues from China, as later research has
confirmed (Yuangrat 1981). In other cases, the links were exaggerated. The largest
communist party in the region, Indonesia's PKI, did not have a substantial Chinese
following and the exact nature of its relationship with Beijing remain unc1ear. The
insurgency that peaked in the Philppines in the early 1950s, and was reborn 15
years later, was very much a local Filpino affai in terms of leadership, inspiration
and recruitment. Nevertheless, the political lexicon of the era identified Asian
communism as Chinese-led, and a shadow was cast over the ethnic Chinese. As
Lea Wiliams, wrting in 1966, put it: the ethnic Chinese were seen as "woven into
a giant subversivenet ready to paralyze and conquer Southeast Asia on command
from Peking" (Wiliams, 1966,p.3).
The perceived threats associated with the Overseas Chinese are c1early
demonstrated in the Malaysian case. The standard Malay perspective was that of
a backward community which feard that the more advanced community - the
Chinese - would by virue of their numbers, skills and economic power
eventually become dominant. In this communal calculus, security in the sen se of
the social, economic. and political power of the Malay community was at stake.
The result was the Allance, a consociatiónal formula worked out by the
established leaders of the Malay, Chinese and Indian leaders and buttressed by
deparing colonial power (Milne 1980, Enloe 1986). The formula implied reverse
discrimination favoring the Malays in education, politics and certain public sector
employment. The entie strcture - which remained the framework for Malaysian
politics for decades - was anchored in a general concept of nativist (bumiputra)
justice. The formula was designed to maintain the political dominance of the
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Malay community, and, as later made explicit, also to advance the Malays
economically.
Until well into the 1960s, Malaysia (then Malaya) also faced a serious challenge
to the entie established order. The prolonged insurgency was based on a radical
communist ideology which threatened the pilar of the social system - the
traditionallegitimacy of the Malay rulers, an economic development founded on
integration with the Western capitaist system and aide by local Chinese capital
and entrpreneurs, and a consociational formula among established communal
leaders. Since the insurgents recruited heavily from the poorer Chinese segment
of the population, and was at least verbally supportd by China, the link between
ethnic Chinese and national securty threats seerned readily evident to the Malays
and the British who helped defeat the insurgency.
Without doubt, national security scenaros involving local Chinese and communists
were of ten inflated during the cold war years to mask narow power interests. All
kinds of strategies that served incumbent elites could be justified in terms of
"national security". The ethnic Chinese were of ten caught in policies designed to
secure foreign assistance, suppress local opposition, or extract economic
concessions from the ethnic Chinese themselves. In Thailand, for instance, the
second militar regime of Phibul Songkrm (1948-54) targeted the ethnic Chinese
parly to attract Western aid and bolster its own legitimacy, in the process using
some of the nationalist symbolism ofPhibul's first regime (1938-44). In Indonesia,
the Chinese became par of the complex power strggle that centered on the
abortive coup in 1965. The legitimacy of the miltar-Ied "New Order" which
followed was based on a paricular interpretation of that coup, which identified
China and its local allies as the principal national security threat. Although the
primar local victim and suspect was the Indonesian communist pary (PKI),
suspicion also fell on the ethnic Chinese. The result was suppression and enhanced
vulnerabilty to economic blackmail from miltar leaders and local competitors.
Non-naturalized ethnic Chinese were especially exposed (Suryadinata 1978). The
complexity of the situation was again revealed when Indonesia in 1989 prepard
to normlize relations with China. In this connection, the Indonesian government
moved to faciltate naturalization for an estimated quarer of a millon alien
Chinese on the grounds that this would remove any pre text for China to intervene
to protect its citizens. The opponents of normalization, who cited security dangers
if China again were permtted to open an embassy in Jakarta, all had vested
economic interests in the status quo (Suryadinata 1990, Yahuda 1985).
In all the Southeast Asian states, relations with China affected the issue of the
Overseas Chinese, and vice versa. Normal relations with revolutionar China, it
was feard, would encourage the overseas Chinese to be more assertive, alternately
subversive, and ultimately posed the threat of Chinese intervention under the
pretext of protecting local nationals. In fact, and despite its intermttent jus
sanguinis position, revolutionar China in the Mao years never attempted, and
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hardly possessed the capacity, to protect the Overse as Chinese in Southeast Asia.
Nevertheless, the smaller Southeast Asian states which shar a land border with
China could be vulnerable to a diect intervention. In the late 1970s, Beijing made
an issue of the situation of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam and eventually went to
war against its neighbor in 1979 (see below). Also Bura, another state which
shared a land border with China, had shar difficulties with China over the ethnic
Chinese.
Anxious to separate foreign policy from domestie minority politics, the post-
colonial states of Southeast Asia adopted integrationist or assimilationist policies.
Simultaneously, and in a contradctory vein, exclusionist policies were designed
to mark ethnic boundares and restrict economic options. This was especially
pronounced in Indonesia, and only the Indonesian government in this period tred
to availed itself of the expulsion option.3 Twenty years later, in 1979.80, also
Vietnam tred to deal with the issue of overse as Chinese by expulsion, although
this time it took the form of large-scale refugee flows.
Integrationist policies generally prevailed. While allowing for distinct varations
within the region, by the late 1970s the local Chinese appeared as a hyphenated
minority. They of ten adopted national names and usually were educated in the
national language (Gosling and Lim 1983). The development signified a shift in
terms ofChinese identity, Wang Gungwu argues, which was much less threatening
to the local states than the previousChinese nationalist identity which had an
element of political exc1usiveness, and Chinese cultural identity which did the
same for culture (Wang 1988). Instead, ethnicity became the central paradigm for
understanding the local Chinese. Ethnicity cared no paricular connotations
regarding political loyalty, could accommodte fused cultures, and focused on
local minority rights and duties rather than foreign ties. Increasingly, the Chinese
became viewed as just another and perhaps less troublesome minority than other
minorities. It is indicative that in Malaysia, the most institutionalized plural polit Y
of Southeast Asia, there were signs in the late 1980s of a vertical spli in the
conscociational Allance as a B-team of dissatisfied Malays leaders contemplated
a rival alliance with likeminded dissidents of the other ethnic groups (Chee 1989).
In a reinforcing development, the regions's most distinetly Chinese insurgency had
ended. The last flcker was formally extinguished in 1989 when Chin Peng, the
long-time leader, appearedin Malaysian to announce it was all over. In Thailand,
the insurgency collapsed under the weight of suppression and its own weakness
3 In the con text of economic indigenization policies, mob violence and attempts to force Chinese
out of the rual reta trade, president Sukamo negotite with China "the retur" of thousands
of Chinese. The option proved unrealistic. The arangement was shortived and involved only
a small fraction of Indonesia's ethnic Chinese. In 1960, about 100,00 went to China on
Chinese-provided vessels, and were settled in southern provinces of China which their ancestors
had probably left several generations earlier (Wiliams 1966:66).
10
in the second half of the 1970s. On the economic front, developments also
generated a sense of national confidence and strength. Most of the non-communist
countres in the regional ASEAN grouping experienced rapid economic growth in
the 1970s to attan NIC status. Altogether, the result was to shift national securty
theats from the internal to the external realm. Simultaeously, the older "securty"
connotations attached to the ethnic Chinese in the 1950s and 1960s were
attenuate.
The transformation in the natur of the "theat" was substantially helped by
fundamental changes in China and the region which predated the end of the cold
war. With the passing of the Maoist era, China tured to a policy of moderation
and modernization based on greater economic openness to the capitalist world. The
Overseas Chinese were now importntchiefly as a source of remittances and a
network for China's trade with the region. While this underlined the continuous
ties between China and the diaspora, it was rather less theatening in Southeast
Asia than a call to revolution. Simultaneously, Beijing ordered some local Chinese
revolutionares to cease the strggle, and cut off supplies to others in order
improve state-to-state relations with non-communist Southeast Asia.4
The latter had reasons of their own to reciprocate. During the second half of the
1970s, the ASEAN states undertook a foreign policy reorientation. The new stanee
reflected the altered balanee of power in the region brought about by communist
victory in Vietnam (1975), the latter's invasion of Kampuchea (1978), and a short
but nasty Sino-Vietnamese war the following year. Responding to the new power
realities, China and ASEAN formed a quasi-allance against their common enemy
- Vietnam.
The conjuncture of events in domestie and foreign politics during the late 1970s
stared a transformation in the nature of the diaspora problem. With economic
growth and political consolidation on the domestic scene, and new enemies and
allies on the regional horizon, the Chinese in Southeast Asia appeared in a new
light: from being a potentially subversive fifth column of earlier decades, they
were now the useful middlemen in a lucrative China trade. From being Overseas
Chinese, they had be come ethnic Chinese.
4 It is "almost certin" China helped arange Chin Peng's appeance on the Thai-Malaysian
border where vintage rebel leader announced the end of the Malaysian insurgency in 1989
(Wang 1990:72). In a simila gesture, China had already in 1979 shut down the clandestine
radio station V oice of the People of Thailand insurgency which for yeas had urged the Thai
people to support the revolutionar strggle of the Communist Pary of Thailand.
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3. Migration in the post-colonial era
Chinese migrtion to Southeast Asia generally came to a halt by about 1950. For
the next three decades, international migrtion in the region almost ceased. There
was neither economic demand nor political space for large-scale importtion of
foreign labor. In the political sphere, migration was measured against integral
concepts of state and nation that characterize the early independence period.
National sovereignty was seen as absolute and indivisible. Exlusionist nationalist
ideology was promoted to legitimize the new states and integrate the development
process, however defined. Informal settlements on the outer rim of the polit y, or
recognized foreign quarers within the cities as occured in earlier times, were now
unacceptable.s The political importanee of ethnic identity, moreover, was
accentuated by the legacy of colonial migrations and the problem of defining a
formula for power-sharng once colonial rule ended. Ethnic additions would
complicate the rules and were not welcome. Indeed, the very concept of migration
had a colonial imprint, and the problems associated with the Overseas Chinese
constituted a continuous waring against future in-migrations.6
With some modfications, these concerns defined the framework within which the
refugee flows of the post-colonial period were judged.
3.1 Refugees
Until the late 1970s, the c10sed migration policies of the Southeast Asian states
were not seriously challenged. The major sending countr i China, had strct
prohibitions on outmigration. Some regional population flows, as from Mindanao
in the Philppines to Sabah in West Malaysia, was accommodated for special
reasons (see below). Several thousand refugees from French Indochina arrved in
Norteast Thailand immediately after World War Il, and was allowed to settle.
Thai policy represented a continuity of the "c1assical" mode of free immigration
to the periphery of the Kingdom; it also reflected a political decision of Prdi' s
liberal government to aid the strggle against French colonialism and its victim.
When he was replaced by a strongly anti-communist and anti- Vietnamese regime,
policy was reversed in astrking ilustration of the impact of foreign policy on
refugee policy (Poole 1970).
S For instace. 17th centur Thai kings readily permitted foreigners to sette in the capita for
trade and other services. Kings of the Ciu dynast y in th late 18th and early 19th century
allowed an entie Vietnese rebel ary to sette, Iiewise a few thousad Vietnese fleeing
political and religious strfe (Dhiravat 11990, Poole 1970).
6 The restrctive naturalization policies in Southeast Asia reflected such concerns, although only
the Philppines adopted an pure jus sanguinis principle, and even made it retractive in 1947
to overre the preceding jus soUs under American rule (Golay 1969:43).
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The big challenge came in the aftermath of the Second Indochina War (1960-75).
Arguably the longe st, most devastating and most intemationalized war in the
region since World War Il, the conflct produced millons of intemally displaced
peoples and a sustained outflows of persons classified alternatelyas refugees or
ilegal migrants. Seeds of futur conflcts were sown to produced renewed war in
Kampuchea already in 1978, which in tur prouced massive waves of refugees.
The migrtion movements of this period ilustrate with grat clarty the complex
and dose relationships between population flows, on the one hand, and
fundamental political issues. In this tagled web, migration sometimes appear as
an instrment of foreign policy, sometimes as a cause of power strggles within
and among nations, and always as a consequence of such strggles.
The Indochinese population flows are welI-known and documented (Zolberg,
Suhrke, Aguayo 1989, Sutter 1990, SJSS 1990, Suhrke 1991). During the second
Indochina war, relative ly few international refugees appeared. After the war, fear
of retrbution and the new social order prouced massive outflows, mainly to
neighboring ASEAN states and Hong Kong, and a one-time flow into China. The
ASEAN states rapidly adopted a common policy which categorically denied the
arvals refugee status. Temporar asylum was only given on condition that the
refugees moved on. This position, first formulated at an international conference
in Geneva in 1979, was reiterated at asecond Geneva conference in 1989.
A range of concerns, of ten public1y identified as "security" issues, shaped
ASEAN's exdusionist stand. Par of the problem, as seen in the receiving countr,
was the fact that most flows were seen as ireversible rather than temporar
insofar as the refugees fled a new s.ocial order, not a passing upheaval or
repression. Unless made conditional on re settlement elsewhere, asylum would in
practice mean permanent presence. Given the very large numbers involved, this
meant a sizable addition to the local population. Forinstance, 60,00 arved per
month durng the 1978-79 peak period in Malaysia alone, a countr of only 13
milion people.
Unlike the Southeast Asia of the late c1assical period, the ASEAN states were no
longer deficit population countres. A secular trend of growing pressures of
population on resources had formed the backdrop for the region' s insurgencies
after World War Il, whether reflecting divisions cut by dass formations (as in
Thailand and the Philppines) or mainly ethnicity (as in Malaysia). The upsurge
in economic growth of the 1970s in most ASEAN states had relieved some
pressures, but certainly not enough to create large-scale demand for labor that
might justify a relaxed immigration policy. Even in Thailand, which traditionally
had been enjoyed a surplus of land to people, expansive agrcultural growth had
come to an end by the late 1970s (IBRD 1979).
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Stil, the vehemence of the ASEAN rejectionist stad, and the ruthlessness with
which it was pursued, requires further explanation. Much poorer countres have
regularly opened its borders to refugees, e.g. the African states against which the
ASEAN response of ten was measured. The critical factor Hes in the poHtical
calculus made in the receiving area.
The key state was Malaysia, and the calculus plainly ethnic. The Muslim Malay-
dominated government had adtted several Muslim refugees, but no others. The
Muslims inc1uded some smaller groups from the area (about 7,00 Cham from
Camboda, and about 2 500 Burese Muslims); the only large community was
nearly 200,00 Filpino Muslims who in 1968 were given refuge from their war
with the Manila government and - importantly - in the context of tense
relations between Malaysia and the Philppines. Angered by a Philppine terrtorial
claim on the West Malaysian state of Sabah, the Malaysian government
determned that sheltering and also aiding Philppine rebels made goo foreign
policy.
The first, large waves from Vietnam, however, consisted mainly of ethnic Chinese.
To accept them would have upset Malaysia's communal balance. Although the
Chinese question had been attenuated over the years, the political formula was stil
fragile. The New Economic Policy, developed in the aftermath of the devastating
race riots in 1969 and designed to shifted more economic power to the Malays,
had generated new tensions. In 1984 the government prohibited all public
discussion of communal (racial) issues. To admt thousands of ethnic Chinese to
the countr under the se conditions would have weakened the government in its
Malay constituency and could have sparked riots.
Considerations of regime security and internal order were paramount, yet, they
could not be officially arculated without courting the precise dangers they were
designed to avoid. Instead, offcial Malaysian pronouncements focused on the
external security implications. The population flows were seen as policy
instrments of China, or Vietnam. Given Malaysia's customar security
preoccupation with China and the Overseas Chinese, there was a short logical
distance between the fact that the refugees were ethnic Chinese and the assertion
that they were a "fifth column" of China. Alternately, Vietnam - the point of
departure -' was perceived as the underlying threat. Vietnam was said to have
expelledethnicChinese in order to destabilze Southeast Asia and, especially, to
wreck Malaysia's communal order. Vietnamese authorities indeed pressured and
faciltated the Chinese to leave Vietnam before 1979 in away that amounted to
expulsion. It is unlikely, however, that the pUl'Pose was to destabilze the ASEAN
countres - with which Vietnam was tting to mend fences so as to protect its
flan in the imminent strggle with China - rather than to rid itself of an
unwanted ethnic group. From Hanoi's perspective, salient reasons for expellng the
ethnic Chinese pertained to Vietnam's relations with China, not ASEAN. The
14
decision by Vietnam in mid-1979 to cooperate with ASEAN to curb ilegal
outflows testified to these priorities (Sutter 1990:96, Zolberg et al, 1989).
The ethnic grounds for Malaysia's rejectionist stace were widely accepted as
valid. This permtted the other ASEAN members to follow suit, of ten invoking the
principle of ASEAN unit y in an organization strving to mark itself as a regional
actor. Regional cooperation thus lent legitimacy to the rejectionist stance. No state
wanted a substantial, forced in~migration for economic reasons, ethno-political
considerations worked in the some diection. Both Chinese and the Vietnamese
were considered potential ufifth columns"; adtionaUy, the Chinese represented
a politically difficult minority situation thoughout the region. Beyond this, each
ASEAN member developed its paricular rejectionist vers ion which reflected a mix
of "security" concems.
Singapore was the most uncompromising, having only a refuge population of 345
in 1988, ten years after the exodus stared. All others had been swifty passed on,
and countless denied entr. For Singapore it was a way to deny any legitimacy to
the notion that a countr could expel its Chinese minority. As the only Chinese-
majority state in the region, Singapore would be subject to a floo of Chinese in
the event other regional countres pressured their ethnic Chinese to leave. For the
small city-state, forced migration of this kind was a threat to national survival. As
Prme Minister Lee Kwan Yew put it: "You must grow callouses on your
heart...otherwise you wil bleed to death" (cited in Sutter 1990:145).
Thailand conveniently cited ASEAN's rejectionist stand but developed a more
nuance position in a traditionalist mode. Lowland Lao and hil trbes from Lao
were treated more leniently. The Laotians had domestic kin in Thailand, and did
not represent a domestie political complication. More importantly, they were seen
as unproblematic migrants in that the mother countr was too weak to use them
politically or intervene to protect them. Laos was a small and weak state that
traditionally had occupied a deferential position in relation to the more powenul
Thai kings.7 For several years after 1975, Thai governments systematically
sheltered and aided Laotian refugees in order to put pressure on Laos. The
Vietnamese, however, were compelled to move on parly because the mother
countr in this case was a traditional rival and formidable adversar of Thailand.
The Khmer were allowed to stay, but only insofar as the international community
pressured Thailand to grant asylum, andonly as long as they usefully formed an
ary of Urefugee-warors" to push back the Vietnamese (Mason and Brown
1983), Shawcross 1984, Suhrke and Klink 1987).
7 It is well remembered that Thai forces twice had invaded Laos and sacked its capital Vientiane,
first in the late 18th centu and again in the ealy 19th.
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In the Thai case, relations with the sending countr indicated whether the refugees
would be viewed as a threat or an instrment of foreign policy. Refugees from
smaller neighbors were useful instrments (Laos and Camboda); refugees from
at large neighbor and rival were inherently suspicious. The other decisive factor
was the phase of the conflct in the sending countr. In Laos and Camboda, the
conflct continued and the refugees could influence the outcome. In Vietnam the
war was definitely lost.
With modfications, the logic also applied to Sino- Vietnamese relations. As
relations between the two states changed from amty to hostility, the Chinese
diaspora became an inflamed issue, a perceived that for one, and a policy
instrment for the other. Simultaneously, the diaspora were repressed - parly for
reasons independent of state-to-state relations but certnly at an accelerated rate
as these relations worsened. Repression produced massive outmigration which in
turn had a negative feedback on state-to-state relations. The varous sources of
tension finally culminated in war. In narative terms, the conflct can be briefly
sketched:
By 1977-78, relations between the erstwhile communist allies were moving
towards a breakg point (Benoit 1981, Chang 1982, Chanda 1986, Lawson 1984.)
Their strggle over Cambodia also concerned the strcture of power in the region,
particularly Vietnam's role relative to China. In this con text, the ethnic Chinese
in Vietnam (hoa) assumed greater significance. China evidently tred to use the
ethnic Chinese question, if not the ethnic Chinese directly, as a leverage to isolate
Vietnam internationally and put pressure Hanoi in their bilateral relationship.
China was among the first to charge that Hanoi was deliberately expellng the
ethnic Chinese in order to destabilze its neighbours, and drew international
attention to the deprivations of the ethnic Chinese. Possibly, China also sought to
sow panic among the ethnic Chinese by spreading rumors of imminent pogroms,
thus inciting even more Chinese to leave. The mass exodus, of course, served to
stigmatize the Hanoi regime internationally where it was generally interpreted as
the result of a malevolent policy pursued by a ruthless regime.8
Simultaneously, Hanoi pressured its ethnic Chinese to leave. Not only was the
Chinese-controlled commercial sector of South Vietnam nationalized and former
urbanites drven to harsh agrcultural work zones. In the context of escalating
Sino- Vietnamese tension,ethnic Chinese in both the North and the South were
suspected of being a fifth column for China. When the war stared, China cited
among other things the need to stop the influx of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam.
B y then, about a quarer of a milion hoa had been resettled in Southern China.
The refugees did strain Chinese reception facilties, but the principal reason for
8 Hanoi countered that the outflow was a necessa consequence of reconstrction and soial
transformation under unfavorable historical conditions.
16
war was Vietnam's prior invasion of Camboda. China had to "teach Vietnam a
lesson", as Beijing explained when its forces attacked.
As the Indochinese refugee movements show, population flows caused by
primary political or social stre car some of the original conflct with them.
Such flows have an inherently political impact in the receiving states. By
extendig asylum, the receiving state becomes at least indiectly a pary to the
conflct. Some actively utilze the refugees as instrments of foreign policy. For
these reasons, refugee flows typically appear in international adversaral contexts.
Some refugees have international patrons, others flee in the diection of greatest
anticipated support. However, militat activity by refugees across the border may
complicate the foreign policy of the host state and undermne asylum. Thus, the
Thai government in 1991 returned some Burmese refugees to Burma (Myanmar)
in the interest of maintaining goo relations with Rangoon. The government of
Papua New Guinea in the late 1980s restrcted the activities of the West Iran
separatist forces operating from the PNG-side of the border.
By contrast, internationallabor migration does not operate in the same adversaral
context as between sending and receiving states. Nor do they impose a legal
obligation on the receiving state to provide entr and varous services, as
international law requires for the treatment of refugees. In principle, refugees have
to be admitted regardless of race and skils; migrants can be handpicked. This
basic difference in the nature of migrant and refugee flows explains why regional
states did not perceive the two as interchangeable. Countres with labor shortages
would reject refugees, but regularly import foreign labor (e.g. Singapore and
Malaysia). The migrants met the needs of the market and other criteria for entr,
the refugees did not.
Yet, "other criteria" than economic also pertained to labor migration in the region.
And while labor movements were not inherently political as were refugee flows,
they c1early posed political probIerns. This was evident when Southeast Asian
countres in the late 1970s became receiving states for migrant labor.
3.2 Labor migration
For the first time since the colonial period, rapid economic growth in Southeast
Asia durg the 1970s and.1980s attracted substantial labor migration to countres
in the region (Hugo 1991, Stahl 1991). Most migrants came from low-income
countres in the region (Indonesia, the Philppines and parly Thailand), others
came from South Asia. The main receiving countres were the rapidly growing
economies of Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei, increasingly also Thailand. Except
for Brunei, the se were also sending countres, and part of an increasingly complex
network of Asia-wide migration.
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Labor market differentials and migrtion networks largely explain why the flows
developed; political factors ar essential to understand the reception given the
migrants. Two basic patterns developed on the receiving side.
One was the tightly controlled response exemplified by the Singaporean case
(Gunasekaran and Sullvan 1990, Chiew 1991). A small city-state intensely
preoccupied with national surival, Singapore formulate an imgration policy
that was uniquely rational and ruthlessly implemented. Immgrnts were grded
accordng to skils and race, and fitted into slots designed to meet economic nees
and maintain Singapore' s racial balance. For instance, the government determned
in 1989 that the countr needed 25,00 Chinese from Hong Kong to compensate
for outmigration of its own skilled Chinese, and the low fertilty rate among
Singapore's Chinese population compared to the Muslim minority. At the same
time, the Hong Kong Chinese were supposed to meet property or skill
requirements.
With the most advanced and growing economy in the Southeast Asia, Singapore
needed a range of manpower. Each type - from maids to managers - were
given a place on the official immigration ladder, from citizenship application to
temporar work permits. Nevertheless, Southeast Asian realities of labor mobilty
and sharly uneven economic growth constantly pressed against the official
regulations. Next door were Indonesia's uncounted milions of under~ and
unemployed, the Philppines had for decades been a major labor exporting countr,
and thousands of workers from Thailand and Burma were moving south in search
of employment. Unless immgration was rigorously controlled, Singapore would
become inundated, thereby jeopardizing its racial status quo and prized social
order.
Possibly springing from a deep sense of vulnerabilty, social order had long been
at the core of Singaporean concepts of national survivaL. Singapore was a small
island of Chinese in a sea of Malays, as the picture was of ten drawn; a city state
dependent upon an entrepot economy whose only resources were the skilIs of its
people and lovely orchids. To regulate immgration was a critical test of
governmental capacity and control, hence also a basic element of social order. The
government resolved in 1989 to demonstrate its c ap aci t y by altering the
constitutionso as to permt corporal punishment for ilegal immigration, applicable
to both migrants and the employers who hired them.9
Generally, Singapore has been able to control both legal and ilegal migration, as
has the oil-rich Brunei. Temporar workers must leave when the contraet expires,
9 At first, amnesties netted some 12,00 undocumented workers who were expelled without
punishment. Subsequently, ilegal workers from Thailand, Indi, Maaysia and Indonesia were
punished by caning and jail sentences (Gunasekaan and Sullvan 1990, 64).
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and ilegal workers are summarly dealt with. This has been possible by exercizing
a commanding sense of political purose and efficient instrments of social control
in a terrtorially compact state.
In Malaysia, by contrast, immgration was not tightly controlled and increasingly
became a source - as well as an instrment - of political conflct
(Gunasekarakan and Sullvan 1990, Vatikotis 1992). This was evident in
peninsular Malaysia, but more c1early in the East Malaysian state of Sabah. When
Sabah in the late 1960s had opened the gate to Filpino Muslim refugees, local
politics had haronize with federal interests.10 Subsequently, a steady flow of
undocumented workers from both the Philppines and Indonesia moved into Sabah
and its burgeoning economy. By the late 1980s, they accounted for about 60 per
cent of the service sector and 90 per cent of the agrcultural plantation labor.
By this time, federal-state relations had change to an acrimonious dispute over
who would control the rich East Malaysian state. The battlelines were drawn along
communal lines. The leading state pary, Pari Bersatu Sabah (PBS), led by a
member of Sabah's "indigenous" Christian Kadazan-Duzun community, charged
that the federal government permtted ilegal migrations in order to register the
workers on the electoral rolls. The charges were probablycorrect. The
undocumented workers were mainly Muslims and could beexpected to support the
Malay-Muslim federal UMNO pary, which had instituted a vigorous campaign to
unseat the PBS in Sabah. Shar increases in voter registration furer substantiated
the theory that a process also observed in India's Assam was at work: the electoral
contest drew ilegal migrants into the vortex of political conflct.11 Good relations
with the Philppines, however, ensured that the potentially explosive issue did not
spil over into foreign affairs.
In different ways, Malaysia and Singapore ilustrate the complexities of labor
migration in multiethnic states where ethnicity has been highly politicized or
institutionalized. Asymmetres in economIc and political power between sending
and recipient countr may also create international tension - the major sending
countr (Indonesia) is also a large power, while the main recipient countres
(Malaysia and Singapore) are not. Despite these problems, present regional trends
c1early point towards increased migrtion. High income NIC states experience
shortages of labor and dec1ining fertlity, while other countres have abundant
labor supply. Economic growth thus poses a major domestie challenge for the
10 The then Chief Minister of Sabah, Tun Mustapha, was hostile towards the PhUippine
government and a fervent Muslim.
11 Voter registration in Sabah as a whole increasd with 28.5 per cent from 1986 to 1989. In some
constituencies the electoral rolls grw by 43 per cent over five yeas. (Vatiotis 1992,30). The
PBS had openly challenged MaIay-Muslim power on the federal level by leaving the National
Front coalition in 1990.
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successful ASEAN states. The perceived problem is no longer how to keep people
out, as durng the Indochinese refugee crisis, but how to brig in the "right" kind.
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